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The Evolution of the American Labor Market, 1948-1980
ABSTRACT
The United States' Labor Market has experienced significant changes
in the composition of the work force, the type of work performed, the
institutional rules of operation and the structure of wages, employment,
and unemployment since World War II. Some of these changes continue historic
trends while others have diverged from developments in earlier decades. This
paper identifies seven of the most important changes, documents their
magnitude, and seeks to estimate their impact on the economy.
The seven changes are: 1. a decrease in the rate of growth of real
wages and labor productivity; 2. a change in the age, sex, and education
composition of the work force; 3. a significant change in the composition
of labor demand and employment; 4. a decline in the proportion of workers
in trade unions; 5. changes in operations rules and procedures of firms
and unions; 6. the altered structure of wages; and 7. changes in the rate
and composition of unemployment and its relation to wage inflation.
Richard B. Freeman




Since World War II, the labor market in the United States has experienced
significant changes in the composition of the work force, type of work performed,
institutional rules of operation and structure of wages, employment and unemploy-
ment. Some of the changes continue historic trends. Others. however, have
diverged from developments of earlier decades to create new labor market condi-
tions and problems. In this paper, I identify seven of the most important
changes, document their magnitude, and seek to estimate their impact on the
economy. The s~ven changes are:
(1) A decreasing rate of growth of real wages and labor productivity.
For the first time in recent American economic history, the real
(constant dollar) pay and average output per worker have failed to
increase substantially over an extended period of time. From 1900 to
1966, real earnings increased by 2.1% per annum. From 1966 to 1978,
real compensation per manhour increased by jUdt 1.7% per annum. Output
per worker grew by 2.4% from 1900 to 1966, compared to just 1.8% from
1966 to 1978. Slackened growth of real earnings and productivity in
the 1970s represent one of the major changes in the United States' labor
market.
(2) A changed 1se; sex, and education composition of the work force.
Continuing historic trends, the percentage of the work force that is
female, and the percentage with high school and college training have io-
creased, while the labor participatioorate of older men has declined. The
age structure of the work force was also altered as a result of the post
World War II "baby boom". These de!:1ographic changes make the typical worker
io the latter part of the 20th century different from the typical worker in
earlier decades and have led to different market problems.
(3) A significant change in the composition of labor demand and employment.
Continuing long-term historic .trends, the fraction of workers employed in
/-2-
white collar occupations, in government, and in the service industries
increased in the period under study, while the fraction working as factory
operatives or laborers, and in agriculture declined. In Dore detailed
sectors, there were also marked changes in the composition of employment,
with the number of workers in some industries (i.e., coal) decreasing in
early postwar years and then increasing in the latter years, while the con-
verse occurred in other industries (i.e., education). In a strikingly new
development, the growth of demand for educated wQrkers fell short of the
growth of supply, with the result that the quality of jobs obtained by the
educated declined. The sizeable changes in employment by industry and
occupation highlight the flexibility of the work force in response to .
dynamic changes in demand for labor in a modern economy.
(4) A declining proportion of workers in trade unions
In 1954, 35% of nonagricultural workers in the U.S. were in trade un~ons;
in 1974, only 26% were so organized -- adecline in the extent of union
organizati~n of comparable magnitude to the decline in percentage organized
in the 1920s. The decline in the proportion organized is the resultant of
two divergent trends: a steep fall in the proportion of private wage and
salary workers who are organized, even in traditional union strongholds;
contrasted with a sharp rise in the proportion of public sector workers
who are organized. Thus, unionism has become less prevalent and qualitatively
different than in the immediate post-World War II period.
(5) Changes in the rules and procedures of operation of firms and unions.
Three important sets of forces have fundamentally altered the way in which
companies hire, fire, promote, and otherwise treat workers: equal oppor-
tunity and affirmative action legislation by the federal government; other
federal laws such as in occupational health and safety; and the advent of
computerized personnel files. These forces have transformed the personnel
practices of companies to an· extent unprecedented since the onset of the-3-
scientific management movement of the l890-l920s. They have had a particularl}
significant effect on the way enterprises treat minority and women workers.
(6) An altered structure of wages.
Differentials in wages by race, age, educati?n, and occupation have under-
gone fundamental changes in the period. The wages of young workers have
fallen relative to the wages of older workers. Blacks have gained relative
to whites. The composition of the wage package has also altered, with
fringe~ becoming an increasingly large share of labor cost. Sizeable
medium term changes in the differentials paid different groups of workers
highlight the flexibility of wage structures.
(7) Changes in the rate and composition of unemployment and its relation to
wage inflation.
The average rate of unemployment in the United States drifted upward in the
period under study. In the 1950s, unemployment averaged 4.5%; in the 19705,
6.2%. The fraction of the unemployed who are young workers, particularly
young minority workers, has risen noticeably as has the fraction in
high skill groups. The rate of change in money wages coincident with
given levels of unemployment rose over the period, destroying the once
widely held belief in the existence of a stable Phillipps curve linking
wage inflation to unemployoent.
Plan of Study
What are the quantitative dimensions of the seven changes sketched out
above?
To what extent do the changes represent continuance of past labor market
developments or fundamentally new patterns of change?
What caused the seven major changes?
The paper seeks to answer these questions. First it analyzes the magnitude
of each of the seven changes and the extent to which they represent a continuation-4-
of historical trends or fundamentally new economic developments. Then it
tries to determine the cause of the changes and their meaning for the opera-
tion of the United States' economy.
Change (1): Growth of Real Earnings and Labor Productivi~
Perhaps the most distrubing post-\~or1d War II trend in the American
labor market has been the notable retardation in the growth of real wages
and output per manhour that began in the late 1960s. As Table 1 shows, long-
term increases in real compensation per manhour on the order of 2.1% per annum,
which had risen in the 1947 to 1966 period, declined to just 1.7% from
1966 to 1978. The rate of growth of real average hourly earnings (which exclude
fringe benefits and are thus a less desireable measure of earnings, but which
is widely used in analyses) fell from 2.4% (1947 to 1966) to just 0.8% (1966
to 1978). Concomitant with the decline in real earnings was a sharp fall in
the growth of output per manhour.
Is the retardation in the growth of real earnings and productivity
the result of sectoral shifts in the economy, such as the reduced flow of
workers out of agriculture or the shift into services? Analysis by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics suggest that 22% of the reduction in growth from
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1947-1966 to 1967-1978 can be attributed to sectoral shifts, which falls far
short of accounting for the bulk of the retardation. That sectoral changes
are not the prime force at work is documented by the fact that productivity
growth has decreased in most industries: in 47 of the 62 industries for which
the B.L.S. calculates productivity, rates of change in output per employee hour
~ere lower from 1966 to 1976 than from 1947 to 1966. Similarly, while rates of
change in earnings differ for various groups of workers [see the discussion of
Change (6)] only in coal was the rate of increase in real earnings higher
1/
post-1969 than pre-l969. The seventies's retardation is not the result of
the changing industrial mix of the economy.· ·····--·-·-·.··••·--.--.·_•.•..•.•.._ .•c.••_••.._•...._ .._.__• ~ _
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Table 1
Retardation in the Rate of Growth of
Productivity and Real Earnings
-----~----_....~- ----- - -------.. -.._--..-._- . --.-._-----_._..
Compound Annual Rates of Change
Productivity
1. Output per manhour (NBER)
2. Private businesssector output
per hour of all persons (BLS)
Real Earnings
3. Annual earnings
4. Compensation per manhour















Source: Line 1: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, Part I.
Series D-683, p. 162.
Line 2: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1978. Bulletin 2000, Table 79,
p. 229 with 1978 from Monthly Labor Review, August 1979,
Table 31, p. 103. (Note: 1947-66 based on hours worked con-
cept from labor force data with 1978 estimated from 1977-78
from change in output per hour using established data).
Line 3: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, Part I.
Series D-726, p. 164 for 1900-60; Series D-722, p. 164,
deflated by E-135, p. 210. I calculated the growth rate
from 1900-60, then fro~ 1960-66, and used the final figure
to calculate 1900-66. A similar procedure was used to get
1947-66.
Line 4: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1978. Bulletin 2000, Table 80,
pp. 231-232 with update from Monthly Labor Review, August 1979,
Table 31, p. 103. Because of slight inconsistencies between
the series, I used the percentage change from 1977-78 in the
~onthly Labor Review to update the series.
Line 5: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Honth1y Labor Review, p. 81 for average hourly earnings,
p. 89 for consumer price index deflator in 1978 with earlier
figures taken from Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1978,
Table 118, p. 399.-6-
The retardation in growth rates is also not directly explicable by the
sluggish state or the economy in the 1970s. Regression analyses of the log of real
earnings or productivity per ~anhour on a trend variable, a 1970 trend, and a rnea-
sure of business cycle, the level of unemployment, yield significant negative 1970
trend coefficients. Comparable regressions using a first difference format and
3/
using different trend breaks yield similar results.-
Accepting the retardation of growth as real, what factors can be
adduced to explain the pattern of change?
A ~~jor effect to account for the 1950s slowdown has been made by
Denison, who has used standard growth accounting methods to attribute the
decline in productivity to selected factors. Table 2 presents the results of his
analysis for the period 1948-1973 and 1973-1976. While Denison's period.is shorter
than that in Table 1, suffers from reflecting cyclical (the 1974-1975 recession)
as well as secular patterns and other problems, his estimates offer the best
available evaluation of the magnitude of factors at work.
With respect to labor inputs, Denison finds little impact of changes in
workers' hours and attributes to the decelerated growth rate: the sizeable increase
in the.educated work force in the period, ~hich tends to raise growth, is balanced
off by the decrease in labor input due to fewer hours worked and the changing
age-sex composition of employment. Extending these calculations over a longer
period of time is unlikely to greatly alter the results [see Change (2)].
With respect to the other major input, capital, Denison's calculations
suggest only a modest role to slower capital formation per person in the retarda-
tion. From 1948 to 1973 Denison finds a growth of capital and per person
employed of .35 points, compared to .24 points from 1973 to 1976, a modest retar-
dation of .11 points compared to the decline in productivity of 2.97 points. Using
different data, Mark obtains an even stronger result as he finds that "the capital-
labor ratio grew at about the same rate from 1966 to 1976 as it did from 1947 to
1966" (p. 198), eliminating it as an explanatory factor.-7-
Three other possibilities for explaining the retardation deserve
attention. First is the decline in expenditures on R&D relative to national
output. Hhile the drop in R&D may have complex effects on the economy, estimates
of its contribution to the retardation of growth using standard growth accounting
suggest only a modest impact (Denison, Griliches).
Second is what Denison calls "changes in the legal and human environ-
ment," due in large measure to governmental regulation [see Change (6)]. While
there is general agreement that regulations have reduced measured productivity,
estimates of their magnitude are difficult to obtain. Those of Denison indicate
that costs incurred to protect the physical environment and health and safety of
workers may explain as much as 13% of the retardation (-.40/-2.97).
The third, and most controversial factor, is the rise in energy prices.
Some analysts place great weight on the increase in energy prices and resultant
decline in energy used in their analyses of productivity (Jorgenson & Hudson). The
fact that the timing of the drop in productivity and real wages was concentrated
after 1973, which is roughly coincident with the rise in oil prices due to.OPEC,
tends to support this interpretation. On" the other' hand, other analysts (Perry,
Denison, Bruno & Sachs) attribute a smaller impact to the rise in energy prices,
largely because energy use has not declined dramatically and does not constitute
a large share of national product.
As Table 2 shows, the bottom line in Denison's calculations for pro-
ductivity growth in the 1970s, like those for earlier times, leaves the final ex-
planation open to question, for the key factor is changes in the residual "advances
in knowledge and miscellaneous determinants", which dropped from positive 1.41 to
negative -.75 in the period covered. In sum, while there is general agreement
that there was a marked break in trend in productivity and real wage growth in
the period covered, the cause and possible long-term persistence of the change
remain open to question.
Is the retardation a phenomenon unique to the United States in the-8-
Table 2
National Income Per Person Employed in




Orowtb lUte••••••••_ •••••.••••••••_ ••- •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••




BOUMI•••••_ ••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••- ••••••••••••_ ••••_-••••••- •••••••••
Ag&-.el: com~Uon.••••__••__._••_ ••••••_ •••_ •••_ •••••••••••••••••••••
Eduatlon•••••••••••_ •••_ •••••_~••••••• ••_ ••••••••__•••••••_••••••
ChLr.gM In ceplW end lend per PflnOn emploTed:
Invenlorles•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
~onrf'ddenUel.tmctures and equlpm.nt••_ ••••••••••••••.•••••••••_ •••••••••"•••
Land••_ ••••••••••••••••••••_ ••••_ ••••_ ••_ ••_ ••_••••••••••_ •••--.-•••••••••
Oulput per ..nil ofInpat:'
Irnprov'Od eJlocaUon oC re3<l1lJ"u:3 ••••••.••_ ••••••••_ •••••••_._•••••_ ••.••••••••••••
Chenges In thel~eland b=an .nvironment•••••••_ .••••••••••••••••••••••••.••.••
EconomJes oC scaI•.•••••••••••••••••_ ••••••••••_."•••••••••••••••••__••••••••••••••
Irrogular la.clo"L••.•••.•••.•.••••••••••••..••••••••••••..••••••••••••••••••••••••••••












I. Contribul101'-' to Ih.r;rowth ....1.shown In !ub!equeellln.. ere r«1trictod lo e~..,t3 upon output per unito!lnput.
2. lnclede:'! only.elm rl':lultlr.g !rom the reallocation oC lebor out 01 tannlllJl end out oC !e!1~:nplorm.nt and unpeld lemUr
I&bor In=allnon!ann .nterprU05. .
3. bclede:'l only the .fleets on output I'<'r unit orInput orcosls Incurred to prolect tb. pbplcal envlronm.nt end the saCetT
and he.'l.lth or worker>. end orcos~01 cllibonestTandaime.
4. ObWnod II.! eres1dueJ.
Source: Ed,..erd F. D.rJso~ .A.uour.!ing1<It Slower Economi( GrolCtJl: TIl. Unlltd Str.:" in U~ /grO., Tbe Brooldngs lrutltu'
Uo~ I~;-g.Table.-3. (Tob. publlsbed)-9-
post-1967 period, or is it a oore general process?
Table 3 presents evidence on the growth of productivity and real wages
in several developed countries and in the United States which suggest that the
retardation has characterized most of the developed countries, and is thus more
likely due to worldwide economic trends than to developments specific to the
United States.
What stands out in Table 3 is the fact that both before and after the
period of retardation, the growth rate of the United States was exceedingly dismal:
worse than that of every country save the United Kingdom. }loreover, though in
earlier decades slower growth in the U.S. might be attributed largely to higher
initial levels of productivity and real earnings, such an explanation has de-
creasing validity. Despite serious problems of comparison due to exchange rate
fluctuations, there is no doubt that the U.S. no longer has a major advantage in
real income over other ~ajor developed countries: by the latest B.L.S. co~parisons,
in fact, the U.S. had lower compensation per hour worked than did 'Belgium, Germany,
41 '
the Netherlands, and Sweden:- Finally, it also is important to realize that the
more sluggish increases in real wages in the United States compared to other
developed .countries are partially attributable to the rough constancy of labor's
share of compensation in national income in the U.S. in the period, co~pared to
5/
an upward trend in labor's share in several of the other countries.
Since growth of productivity and real wages is the essence of economic
progress, the declining rates of increase in the 1970s represent a potentially
~ajor econo~ic problem. Productivity advances are necessary for inproving
~verage living standards and make numero~s national goals easier
to attain. Reduction of poverty, increased real defense spending, allocation
of a greater share of desireable jobs to women and ~norities, and increased
support of older persons is easier, most would agree, in a rapidly growing
economy than in a sluggish one. In the late 1950s, the Rockefeller Brothers
issued a report comparing the growth of the U.S. to that of the Soviet Union and
called for a major effort to raise the U.S. growth rate. If the falloff in the-10-
Table 3
Compound Annual Increase in Output Per Hour and
Real Hourly Earnings in !1anufacturing
1960-1977
Output Per Hour In
Manufacturing
Real Hourly Earnings of
Production Workers In
Hanufacturing
1960-1967 1967-1977 1960-1967 1967-1977
u.s. 3.4 2.4 1.5 0.9
Belgium 5.2 8.2 5.2 5.5
Canada 4.2 3.7 2.0 3.6
Denmark 6.0 6.4 4.1 5.1
France 5.5 5.5 3.4 5.1
Germany, F.R. 5.7 5.4 5.5 4.5
Italy 6.3 4.0 5.1 7.8
Japan 9.6 7.5a 4.1 7.4
Netherlands 5.8 7.9 6.4 4.5
Sweden 6.8 4.6 4.0 3.2






Source: u.s. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Hanbaok of Labor Statistics, 1978. Bulletin 2000
(United States Government Printing Office, Hashington,
D.C., 1979). Table 164, p. 582 and Table 168, p. 586.-11-
1970s represents a new secular pattern of productivity growth rather than a
temporary phenomenon, national attention should, perhaps, focus once more on
policies to strengthen productivity growth.
Change (2): The Composition of the Work Force
In 1978, there were over 103 million persons aged 16 and over in the U.S.
work force, of whom 94.4 million were in the civilian work force. Forty-one
percent of the work force were women; nearly half were less than 35 years of age;
and about one-fourth were between 16 and 24; approximately one in three had
attended college for at least one year and one in six was a college graduate;
over 70% were high school graduates; and about lOr. may have been illegal
!!-/
aliens.
Thirty years earlier, the composition of the labor force was quite dif-
ferent, with relatively fewer women, young persons, and highly educated workers.
The labor force participation rate of married women with spouse present more than
doubled over the period, and the proportion of married.wbmen in the labor force
with children under six nearly tripled. TDe participation of men, by contrast,
fell, especially those in the 55 to 64 age bracket and non-white. In the span
of only three decades, the work force had chaneed to a remarkable extent (see
figure 1).
The most important change was the influx of wor-en into thejob market,
particularly of married women with children. In the early part of the post-
World War II period, most of the increase occurred among older women, many of
whom were returning to work as their children reached school age. Nearly
80% of the growth in the female workforce between 1947 and 1965 resulted
from increased numbers of women aged 35 and over, whose labor force participation
rate rose sharply. By contrast, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the major
source of growth of the female work force was among younger women, with 77~
of the increase coming from persons less than 35 years old. From 1965 to 1977,
the participation rate of women aged 20 to 24 rose from 50% to 677..while that of
Jj
women aged 25 to 34 rose from 39% to 60%.-12-
Figure 1:
Fractions of Work Force
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Under Six
Source: U.s. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1978.
Table 1 (percent female), Table 3 (age data). Table 4 (male parti-
cipation rate), Table 12 (education data), Table 14 (female partici-
pation rate).-13-
The increased p.articipation of women in the work force was related,
prestll:lably partly as cause and partly as effect" to several important social
deve10p~ents. The downward trend in fertility that followed the postwar
baby boom was undoubtedly linked to the change ~n participation, though
the influx of women with children into the work force ~kes it clear that the
link is not the predominant factor at work. Similarly, the growth in the
number of female-headed homes, which was especially sizeable among blacks, is
also likely to have been closely tied to increased female participation. By
1978 only 23% of homes fit into the traditional stereotype husband-wife homes with
'if
men eoployed and no other ~ousehold member in the work force.
On the job side, the female work force was associated with a marked
increase in part-time jobs, which are largely filled by women. In 1950,
16% of persons with work experience over the year we~e part-time workers:
2.1
in 1975. l2%~ and in 1977."21%.
Because of the changes in fertility noted above, there was a remarkable
shift in the age structure of the work force. In the 1950s, the proportion
of the work force below 35 years of age was relatively small because of the
low birthrate during the Depression. In the mid-1960s, however, the number of
younger workers began increasing at unprecedented rates due to the postwar
baby boom. The proportion of workers under 35 years of age jumped from
35% to 50% in the span of only one decade. As the proportion of the young
going on to higher education increased in the period, much of the
growth in the labor force of younger workers occurred among the college-trained.
In 1966, there were 0.49 male college graduates aged 25 .to 34 per graduate 35
10/
years of age and over; by 1976 the ratio had jumped to 0.78.--
The large size of the youth population has had several socio-economic
consequences. It has, as will be seen later, altered the earnings of younger
relative to older workers and made youth unemployment a oajor national concern.
Coupled with 19605 increases in the proportion of young choosing to go on to-14-
college, the increased number of youths sparked a large expansion of the educa-
tion sector and a IIgolden age
ll for colleges and universities. Because crime is
an activity disproportionately conducted by the young, it also raised rates of
criminal activity (see Freeoan and Hedoff, 1980).
Despite the extraordinary increase in the number of young persons and
growth in their labor participation rate, youth unemployment did not rise drarna-
tically in the period studied. Among white youth aged 16 to 19 the number em-
played rose from 4.1 million in 1964 to 7.0 million in 1977 as the proportion
employed actually increased. Among minority youth, however, the proportion in
the labor force and the proportion employed fell while the proportion unemployed
rose. The differential employment prospects facing white and black youth" became
11/
one of the major problemG of the decade. .
One of the most surprising labor force changes shown in figure 1 is the
marked drop in the participation of adult males, particularly older men and
non-white men. In 1954, 86% of men 16 and over were in the work force; in 1977,
79%. Aoong non-whites the decline was even more precipitous, from 85% in 1954 to
71%. The downward trend in non-white male participation is the major discordent
pattern in a period of broad non-white economic advance. Both among whites and
non-whites the drop in participation was concentrated among older men, with the
participation of all 55 to 64 year old men falling by 16 percentage points.
The principal qualitative chanBe in the labor force in post-Uorld
War II years was the increased educational attainment of workers. In contrast to
the situation before World War II~ high school graduation became common among the
young, while a substantial fraction of young men and women chose to go on to college
during the 19605. Between 1954 and 1969, the proportion of 18 to 19 year old men
\
going to college rose from .30 to .44 while the proportion of 18 to 19 year old
women going to college increased from .23 to .36. As a result of increased
enrollments, in the late 19605 and the early 1970s, the number of graduates-15-
grew rapidly. Fro~ 1966 to 1974, the nu~~er of bachelor's degrees granted
doubled, while the nlli~ber of master's degrees and doctorates increased
at nearly the sa~e pace. The boom was accompanied by sizeable changes in the
fields of study and occupations of new graduates, with sot:le specialties like
law or ~illA man~ge~ent enjoying extraordinary growth and others experiencing dif-
ferent patterns of change (i.e., engineering).
At the outset of the 1970s, howev~r, enrollt:lent in higher education
began leveling off. The proportion of 18 to 19 year old men in college dropped
to just 34% by 1974; whereas in 1969 there were 0.5 graduate level enrollees
per college graduate aged 22 to 29, in 1975, there were 0.4 enrollees per bachelor's
graduate in the 22 to 29 year old age bracket. In some Ph.D. specialties, enroll-
ments and degrees granted fell by as much as 40%. Stabilization or decline in
enrollment rates anong the young did not, however, reduce or even greatly affect
the rate of increase in the overall educational attainment of the work force.
Even with the rate~bf the 1970s,the average education of the labor force rose
noticeably. This was because of a continued sizeable difference in years of
schooling between retiring and entering workers. The proportion of college workers
12/
among the young, but not in the work force as a whole, stabilized.
Causes of Change
The economic model of labor supply, in which supply decisions reflect
economic incentives, can be used to analyze changes in female participation, male
participation, and educational investments.
In the siDple economic model, changes in labor force participation are
due to changes in narket wages and in the value of tiDe spent working at" horne
(the 'shadow wage' for household activities). Increases in market wages ~ill raise
labor participation (substitution effect), while increases in the value of working
at horne, due to higher income of other household members, will reduce participation
(incol!le effect).
Improve=ents in household technology, which take the form either of-16-
new machines or tec~.niques or of lower prices for given techniques, can
increase or decrease work activity depending on the extent to which they sub-
stitute for household time, among other things.
The basic effort to explain participation rate patterns follows
a two-stage procedure. First, the effects of the ~~ges of women and of their
husbands on participation are estimated by cross-sectional (more recently, longi-
tudinal) data. Then the changes in these explanatory factors over time are
multiplied by their estiMated effects to assess the impact of the changes on
participation. Because the wages of men and of WOMen have risen at roughly
the same rate over tiQe, the model requires greater female responsiveness to
female wages than to the incomes of their husbands to account for the upward
trends in participation. \{hile most studies have found that women react more
to their ow~ wages than to their husbands' earnings, the differences have not
_13/
been sufficiently large to explain the bulk of increased female participation.
Addition of other factors, such as number of children, does not greatly enhance
the ability to track the trend. Perhaps most discouragingly, the most recent
results for the 1970 Census of Population show that the economic factors "which
together once explained three-quarters of the variation in wives' participation
rates across SHSAs (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) now account for
only one-third of it. }~ny of the variables are no longer significant, and
the strength and explanatory power of all except the unemployment variable have
14/
.declined." \ve are far from accounting for the rise in the participation
of women in terQS of simple economic factors.
One possible missing element from standard Qodels is the nature of house-
hold technology. The household sector is surprisingly capital intensive. In 1975,
the average household had $6,900 in consumer durables. From 1952 to 1975, the
15/
accumulation of durables increased by 5.4% per annum.-- Refrigerators, washing
machincs, and related equipMcnt became increasinr.ly prevalent in the hnm~.-17-
I
Although causc-a~d-effect cannot be readily disentangled, the growth of fast
food servic~s and other restaurants have come to offer a more readily available
(and chosen) alternative for one of the main household products. In the absence
of estimates of the quantitative effect of these factors (and of the substitution
between time and goods in household production), however, we can do no more than
speculate about the effect of technology in "freeing"
Another possible missing element, which must
story with care, is attitudinal changes, potentially
women's liberation movement ~f the late sixties and
·women's time.
be brought into the
associated with the
seventies. That there ·toJere
significant changes in attitudes over the period is apparent from diverse
opinion surveys. As late as 1967, 44:~ of first-year college women and
67% of first-year college men thought "a woman's pl,ace is best at home."
In 1974, only 19% of entering college women and 40% of entering college men agreed
};if
with that view. Clearly, it had become (for whatever reason) more socially
. acceptable for women to devote themselves to careers as opposed to marriage and
family. The extent to which these changes in attitudes were caused by or
caused the labor force patterns is difficult to determine.
The basic economic model can also be used to analyze the decline in
the labor participation of older men. One important economic factor that can
be expected to reduce participation of men 65 and over has been the expansion
of social security coverage, which places a higher tax on earnings after that
age.
Another fattor likely to lower older male participation is private
pension plans, which have also become more widespread in recent years (Skolnik)
and which typically provide strong incentives to leave the job, often in the
form of mandatory retirement. Indeed, mandatory retirement provisions are
sufficiently widespread as to constitute a major institutional provision in
labor contracts (Lazear). Recent changes in the law regarding vesting of-18-
pensions and mandatory retire~ent [see Change (6)] may provide an ioportant
"test" of how private pensions and mandatory retirement rules in fact affect
retirement decisions.
Host empirical studies find sizeable response parameters to economic
variables in retirement behavior, with older men estimated to be Dare sensitive
to wages or nor:..age income than men in general (Cain & \o:atts, 1973). Although
detailed analysis of the effect of social security on retirement is just begin-
ning, the evidence seems to support the attribution of a considerable effect
to the social security mode of retirement pay (Baskin & Hurd, Boskin. Burkhauser
and Turner, Pellechio, Quinn). Recent analysis of the work incentive effects
of social security -- the strong dependence of benefits on final years' pay,
which can increase participation -- does, however, raise some doubts about its impact
(Blinder, Gordon & Wise).
The puzzling drop :.0 the labor force participation of black men has
been explained in part by another component of Social.Security: Disability
Insurance (SSDI). About half of older black men out of the labor force are
recipients of SSDI. Because of their concentration in blue-collar jobs with
substantial risk of job-related injuries and lower wage rates. black nen turn out
to have been more affected by ~he program than white men (Leonard). Still, a
significant proportion of their decline in participation remains unexplained.
Finally. the h~~an-capital analysis of investment in skills provides a
reasonably successful explanation of the changes in the qualifications of the
work force. In the human-capital model, decisions to obtain a certain level
of schooling or skill are made by comparing tW6 income streams: the stream
tllat results from the investment and the stream that would obtain in its absence.
If. at a given interest rate r, the present value of the former exceeds the
latter plus the direct cost of the investment, the individual is expected to
choose the investnent. Because about two-thirds of the private cost of educa--19~
cation turns out to consist of foregone income, as opposed to direct costs,
the analysis directs attention to differences in the wages of more and less
qualified persons as the major factor in investcents in schooling.
Analyses of the link between enrollment patterns suggest that cuch of
the postwar expansion and the seventies' contraction ~n the higher educati9D sys-
teQ can be attributed to changes in economic incentives, measured by wages
or other indicators of rates of return. The growth of enrollments in the
1960s was spurred by improved earnings opportunities for college graduates while
the decline of enrollments in the 1970s appears to be the result of the falling
return to college workers [see Change (5)]. Cross-section (Ro~en and Willis)
and time series (Freeman,1975) analyses find sufficiently high elasticities of
response as to account for the bulk of the changes in male enrollments in terms
of the economic model. The slow-down in doctorate production also appears
explicable in terms of the economic factors at work in that market, although,
in this case, nonprice factors, notably the difficulty of obtaining academic
employment, may be as important as wages in causing changes (Freeman, 1980a).
Finally, the selection of particular fields of study has also been found to
respond to market factors with, for example, relatively many students choosing
education in the 1960s when the school system was expanding and few choosing
this concentration in the 1970s when the teacher's job carket deteriorated
(Hebl). Though by no means without problems, the economic analysis does appear
to provide a good handle on the changing educational attainment of the work
force.
Overall,if one single conclusion about the labor force is to be
drawn from the post-World t~ar II experience, it is that the labor supply
undergoes substantial dynamic shifts and evinces high supply responsiveness
in several dimensions and thus cannot be vie~ed as a stable, inflexible
component of the labor market. Much of the variation of course, rises frommarginally attached groups
-20-
young persons, women, older workers -- rather
than from the prine-age male workers.
Change (3): Demand and Employoent
Figure 2 highlights some of the most signjficant changes in the compo-
sition of employment in the post-Horld Uar II period. With respect to occupa-
tions it shows a nassive shift in employment from blue-collar work, including
agricultural, to white-collar work, particularly into professional, technical
and clerical jobs. Note, however, that the rate of expansion of the white-
collar sector levels off noticeably in the 19705. Between 1950 and 1960 the
proportion in white-collar jobs increased by 4 percentage points; between 1960
and 1970, the increase is by 7 points, whereas from 1970 to 1978 it is just
3 points. Among professionals the slackened rate of increase in the 1970s
is even more striking: after increasing by 3 points between 1950 and 1960 and
by 4 points between 1960 and 1970, the professional share of employment was vir-
tually unchanged between 1970 and 1978.
The slowdown in the growth of professional and white-collar employment at
a time when the number of college graduates is increasing rapidly caused a
&Jajor "underemployment" problem in the college job market. As Table 4 shows,
there was a substantial downgrading in the types of jobs held by graduates,
with fewer holding professional and technical positions and more in b1ue-
collar and lower level white-collar jobs. The modest increase in the propor-
tion of male graduates in managerial positions and the sizeable increase in
the proportion of women in those jobs is, it should be stressed, dwarfed by
the decline in the proportion in technical and professional jobs. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics predicts that in the next decade or so the demand for
professionals will continue to exPand more slowly than supply, creating an
even greater underemployment problem.
The reduction in the quality of jobs and in the relative earnings of
the more highly educated might expect a drop in the job satisfaction of more
highly educated workers, and, according to the University of Michigan Quality-21-
Figure 2: Employnent Distribution
Percent !n1ite-Collar Percent Professional

























Source: 1950-1970 white-collar and professional - U.S. Department of Cor.~erce
Historical Statistics to 1970, D182-232, p. 139.
1978 white-collar and pro£essional - U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earni~s, Ja~~ry 1979, p. 172, 174.
Government data from U.S. Departoent of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Handbook of Labor S~atistics 1978, table 50 with the total employment from
table 1. Regional data from table 52 with total nonagricultural employ-
ment from table 42. South and southwest, defined as regions IV, VI. and
Arizona and Nevada, from region IX. See table 52, p. 159 for precise
definition of regions.-22-
of Work Survey, such appears to have been the case. ~lereas in 1969 college
workers scored higher than high school workers on an overall job satisfaction
index by a considerable amount, in 1977 they scored much lower than in 1969
. 17/
and no higher than high school workers. A major burden has been placed on
employers to adjust to tb_~__Il..!:!W availability of college graduates for jobs
that have traditionally been held by the less educated and to the distorted
age structure of the college work force.
Figure 2 also displays one of the most important changes in the
industrial distribution of the work force: the doubling in the state and
local govern~ents' share of employment in the postwar period. By 1977,orie
in seven workers was employed by state and local governmental bodies compared
to orie in fourteen three decades earlier. One-third of the growth of emplor-
ment over the entire f948.to 1976 period is attributable to expansion of the
public sector (including federal employees). At the other end of the
spectrum there was a continued shift of the work force out of agriculture,
leaving just 3.8% of e~ployed workers in that sector in 1976, and a drop
. 18/
in the self-employed, nonagricultural labor force.
The increased importance of the governmental labor force i~ the economy
has raised a whole host of industrial relations problems. Consider, for example,
the following type of issue: a locality forbids public workers from striking.
This same locality reaches an agreement with the public workers on a certain
wage settlement after collective negotiations, but the citizens of the locality
refuse to raise taxes to pay for this wage settlement. The public sector
workers cannot strike. Should wages be raised to the negotiated levels? If
not, should the public sector workers be permitted to strike to pressure voters
to meet the agreement? Wha.t should be done? A wide variety of answers to
these questions have been ~mployedby various states. As yet, there is no-23-
Table 4
Percent Distribution of Occupations of
Employed College Graduates, 1968 to 1978
HEN War-fEN
1968 1978 6 1968 1978
Professional &Technical 60.6 52.1 -8.5 81.1 65.0 -16.1
Managers & Administrators 22.2 24.5 1.8 4.1 8.7 4.6
Sales tvorkers 6.8 8.9 2.1 1.2 4.6 3.4
Clerical tvorkers 4.4 4.7 0.3 10.6 15.4 4.8
Craft Wor!<ers 2.2 3.9 1.7 1.2 1.9 0.7
Other Blue-Collar tvorkers 1.3 2.7 1.4 1.2 1.9 0.7
Service tvorkers 1.1 2.1 1.0 1.5 3.8 2.3
Faro Workers 0.9 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2
Source: S.C. Brown, "Educational Attainment of. Workers: Some Trends from
1975 to 197~', Monthly Labor Review (February 1979, p.58, Table 5).-24~
general agreement as to the best mode of dealing with public sector industira1
relations problens.
Another widely heralded shift in employment, shown in figure 2, is the
relative decline of employment in the Eastern and Midwestern industrial belt.
The fastest gro\.ing regions of the country were "the South, Southwest, and, to a
lesser extent, the West Coast. r~ny industries moved into the South and South-
west in this period, locating new plants in such states as Texas, Louisianna,
Florida, Arizona, and Colorado. Industrialization of those areas and loss of
employment in New England and the Midwest became a subject of considerable
controversy, due to, in part, the federal government's alle&ed spending
decisions which favored the Sun Belt over the Snow Belt.
The shifts in jobs among occupations, .industries, and areas are the
tip of an iceberg of changes in employment in the job market. Among dis-
aggregated categories there were large changes in employment, with some groups
growing rapidly and others declining and with the grow.th sectors of one decade
often being the declining sectors of the next and vice versus. School teaching,
for example, was a booming occupation in the 19605, but not in the 1970s.
Employment in aircraft and parts rose by 184% from 1950 to 1969 and then fell
by 42% from 1969 to 1977. Employment in all mining dropped from 901,000 in
19/
1950 to 619,000 in 1969 and then shot up to 837,000 in 1978.--
It is important to recognize that the changes in the composition of
eoployment are more extensive than the changes in the structure of wages.
The standard deviation of log changes in employment in three-digit Census of
Population occupations from 1960 to 1970 was .39 compared to a standard devia-
tion in the log changes of earnings in those occupations of .13. Similarly,
the standard deviations in log changes in employment among two-digit manufac-
turing industries far exceed those in wages. From 1961 to 1977 (which hav.e
roughly similar cyclical conditions) the standard deviation on log changes in
production worker employment in 20 two-digit durable and non-durable industries-25-
\.;as . 25, '~'hi1e the standard de:viation in the log changes of average hourly
J:Q/
earnings, exclusive of overtime, was .09. .
One of the fundamental features of the United ·States' economy appears
to be much greater variability in employment by sector than in earn{ngs by
sector. Though the ~age structure changes over time, it has greater stability
than employment.
The principal cause of the structural change in employment among occupa-
tions 'and industries appears to be dynamic shifts in demanc:LJor labor, which
alters enployrnent along relatively elastic supply schedules. While there are
other possible explanations for the concordance of large changes in employment
with more modest changes in wages, the demand/elastic supply interpretation
of the patterns appears to offer the best explanation of the observed phenomenon
(Free:;Jan, 1980b). Some or the shifts in deraand are attributable to broad
economic swings, such as growth of demand for some goods rather than others,
while others are attributable to technological changes.
Employment and Productivitx
Considerable concern has often been expressed about the effect of
technological change on the level of employment in industry. Does el:lp10ynent
increase or decrease in industries undergoing significant technological
progress? The impact of differential increases in productivity and industry
of enployrnent is twofold. All else being the same, industries with large in-
creases in productivity will experience relative declines in emp10ynent since
fewer workers are needed for production. But all else will not remain the same.
An industry with substantial gains in labor productivity will find that labor
costs per unit of output and total costs decline rapidly. The decline in cost
causes prices to fall and induces consumers to purchase more of the industry's-26-
output. Hence, the decline in labor demand associated with the need for fewer
workers per unit of output ~ay be offset by the increased demand for output.
Empirical evidence for the United States in the postwar period indicates
that the employ~ent creating effect of the growth of output are roughly offset
by the disemployment effect of rapid productivity gains. Specifically, the
correlation between changes in output per employee hour and employee hours in
the industries for which the B.L.S. calculates productivity indexes is a bare
21/
-.03:--Thus, rapid productivity is essentially unrelated to growth of employment
by sector. Technological change alters the distribution of emp1o~ent among
industries and occupations, but does not have the feared effect of creating
significant loss of jobs in sectors with rapid productivity growth.
Change (4): Unionism
Collective organization of the U.S. labor force has changed substantially
in the postwar period. Since the mid-1950s, the fraction of private sector workers
who are unionized has fallen gradually while, by contrast, organization of public
sector workers has jumped en~rmously. These two changes have altered the labor
movement in the country and the operation.of the labor market.
The two divergent patterns and their net impact on unionization in the
country are depicted in figure 3, which records the fraction organized in the
private and public sectors and in the country overall. In 1956 the Bureau of
Labor Statistics data showed 34% of private nonagricultural workers to be organ-
ized; by 1974, the fraction had dropped to 26%. In the public sector organization
grew from 12% in 1956 to 19% in 1974, reaching 34% if members of associations,
like the National Education Association,are included as union members. Because
the majority of workers are private employees, the overall percentage has also fallen.
Data on the success of unions in National Labor Relations Board represen-
tative elections tell a similar story about the diminution of private sector
unionism in the United States. In 1950 unions won 74% of NLRB elections; in 1976
their victory rate was below 50%. The fraction of eligible-to-vote workers in
election:; won by unions fell even more sharply as unions had increasing difficultyFigure 3
Union Organization of the Non-Agricultural Sector, 1947-1974
(Union members per'hundred nonagricultural eoployees)
Percent
Private sector
















Source: Total from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1978
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Bulletin 2000, Table ISO, p.s07. Public sector estimated by multiplying the
percent of union members in the public sector from Table 147, pp. 498-503,
by the total proportion by the ratio of nonagricultural employment to govern-
ment employment from Table 42, p. 134. Public sector including associations
obtained by multiplying public sector figures by the ratio of union plus
association membership to union membership from U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Directory of National Unions and Employee Associates, 1975,
Bulletin 1935, Table 15, p.70. Private sector and private sector plus associa-
tion figures calculated using the same tables and methodology. Total association
data from Directory, Table 6, p.63.-28-
in elections in large establishments. Barely a third of workers in elections
were in districts won by unions. As a result, the ratio of workers organized
due to the NLRB elections to the total nonagricultural private work force fell
E:./
from 1.7% in 1950 to a bare 0.3% in 1977.
While trade unions have contracted in earlier time periods -- notably
the 19205 when the percentage of nonagricultural workers organized fell
from 20% to 12% -- the drop in the 19505 to 19705 represents a sharp break with
the long-term trend and a pattern in carked contrast to the growth or stability
of unionism in other developed countries, including Canada, where many of the same
unions and firms operate.
\Vhat explains the erosion of private sector organization of the United
States' labor force? One important factor has been the demographic and employment
changes in the composition of the work force. The proportion of workers who have
historically tended to be less organized -- women, the young, Southwestern workers,
white-collar workers, and so on -- have grown while the proportion in the tradition-
ally organized categories have fallen. Esti.cates by Freeman and Hedoff suggest
that about 60% of the decline in unionism can be explained by such structural
23/
changes (Table 4, p. 24).-- Still, even among blue-collar workers in traditional
strongholds of unionism, there was a sizeable drop in union coverage:
Percentage of production workers 24/
covered by collective bargaining--
1958 1960 1970 1974-1976
Metropolitan Areas 73 61
Northeast 77 66
Hanufacturing 67 61
Electrical ~ffg. 73 58
Petroleum Refining 89 74












* These figures are merely illustrative as the concepts and sources
of the data are quite different.-29-
A second major factor underlying the erosion of unionism among private
wage and salary workers has been increased managerial opposition, abetted in part
by changes in the law. In the early years of the Wagner Act, employers were
severely limited in what they could say or do to oppose unionism. Since the
late 1940s, however, legal enactment (Section 8C) of Taft-Hartley and diverse
NLRB and Supreme Court decisions regarding managemeni: right to "free speech"
in opposition to unionism has significantly altered the nature of the election
process. Nowadays, managements contest elections, ffiakin8 extensive eiforts to con-
vince workers to vote against union, and often enp10ying specialized labor ~anagement
consultants to advise or run their campaigns. In Canada, where the same unions
and management often deal with one another but where the method of recognizing
unions does not allow for management campaigns against organization, trade union
organization of the work force has grown.
Quantitative data from the AFL-CIO and National Industrial Conference
Board suggest that active management opposition has significant effects on the
success of unions. According to the AFL-CIO study, unions won 97% of elections
with no opposition compared to 30% to 40% °in which management opposition was
extensive. According to the NIGB study, unions won 85% of elections in which
companies made either no effort or a limited effort in the form of a written
.letter opposing organization; won 51% in which the company held anti-union
meetings, but won only 34% of elections in which written communication, group
and individual meetings were used to communicate. w~i1e these studies suffer
from potential simu1taneous·problems due to the: possibility that management
does not fight when the outcome isa foregone conclusion in the union's favor,
both union and management officials place great stress on the impact of
opposition, particularly use of expert labor/management consulting firms.
In addition to legal opposition, however, there has been a marked in-













This drop in public approval for unions has occurred within broad occupational
categories (professional and business, white-collar, blue-collar, and faroers).
According to Gallup, it has dropped oost rapidly in the past decade among
adults under 30.
Even with changing attitudes, however, a relatively large fraction of
nonunion workers would like to be unionized. Kochan found that in the 1977
Quality of Enployment Survey 39% of blue-collar workers would vote for
union representation in their workplace, if an election were held,
while 28% of white-collar workers, excluding the self-employed and managers,
would also vote for unions. "Perhaps the most striking finding was that 67%
of all black and other minority workers would vote to unionize" (Kochan .. p. 25).
While all of these workers could be in pliints where even in the absence of
management campaigns·to discourage organization the 1!Iajority 'of workers would
vote down unions, it is more likely that at least some are in plants that would
be-organized if instillNtional procedures were <.1iffer~nt.
Will private sector unionism continue to diminish in the future? The
answer to this question is unclear. On the one hand, even modest efforts to
reform the labor laws in the United States in such a way as to reduce the ability
of management to discourage u~ionism, (e.g. the Labor Law Reform of 1978) have
been defeated. On the other hand, unionism has traditionally grown in sudden
spurts which were never predicted by experts.
What are the economic effects of a proportionately smaller trade union
movement? From the perspective of the monopoly "face" of unionism the decline.
can be expected to reduce the monopoly misallocation of resources due to-32-
unionism and, to the extent that union monopoly wage gains depen~ on the fraction
of the labor force organized (Freeman &Medoff, 1979), also reduce the union
wage advantage. On the other hand, however, reduced unionism can be expected to
adversely affect many of the positive effects of strong unionism -- lower dis-
persion of earnings among workers; lower quit rates; and higher productivity due
to pressures on management to reduce costs in organized firms. As the United
~line t~orkers organization and industrial relations in coal have deteriorated,
productivity in union mines haS fallen sharply. The broader social effects of a
diminished trade union covement remain to be seen.
Public Sector Unionism
While private sector unionism has declined, public sector unionism has
grown rapidly. The largest union in the AFL-CIO is the State, County and
Municipal tvorkers. Teachers have become one of the most highly organized
occupations in the country. In most cities, policemen and firemen negotiate for
wages and work conditions. About half of the federal work force is organized.
This organizatiOn of public sector workers brings the U.S. closer to other
developed countries, where unionism of government employees has long been impor-
tant, and alters the face of the American labor movement. Public sector unions
rely on political rather than economic muscle to obtain desired benefits. Public
sector unions are usually not allowed to strike. Negotiated settlement must
be approved, in many cases, by bodies that decide taxes. As noted earlier,
these distinct characteristics create new industrial relations issues.
What explains the success of unionism in the public sector compared to
the diminution of organization in the private sector?
A good case can be made that the direct cause of union success in the
public sector has been explicit changes in the law regarding public sector
labor relations. First, states with laws that are more favorable to public
sector collective bargaining have the highest proportion unionized. Second,-33-
and more importantly, over time public sector organization has grown rapidly in
states following passage of the more fav6r~b1e laws and has not grown rapidly in
states which maintain laws that discourage public sector unionism. lnone
study, it was found that organization of police increased sizeably following pas-
sage of a: law that required localities to meet and confer with unions (Lauer).
Third, at the federal level, President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 and
ensuing policies toward unionism clearly precipitated the successful organiza-
tion of federal employees. While the political and attitudinal changes that
underlie the new laws may be properly viewed as the fundamental causes of the in-
creased public sector unionism, new laws appear to be a necessary condition for
organizational success.
Concomitant with an increase in unionization in the public sector has
been a growth of strikes among public employees, including white-collar workers
like teachers. In 1956 BLS data show that outside of education there were just
27 work stoppages in the public sector. In 1976 the n~ber of stoppages was
378. For the education sector, National Center for Education Statistics data
reveal only two teacher work stoppages (involving just 210 people) in 1959 com-
pared to 218 stoppages (involving 182,300 teachers) in 1975 (UCES 1978, Table 4.9,
p. 182). Despite the illegality of public sector strikes in most states, teachers
and other public sector workers (except for polic,e and firemen) have come to
view the strikes' asa legitimate mode of seeking contract changes.
Most studies of the effects of public sector unionism on the pay of
,public employees have found moderate differences between the wages of public
sector workers in cities that are organized and cities that are not (see Lewin
for a smnnary), a surprising result in view of widespread concern with
public sector unions and belief that absence of competition for government
functions would create inelastic demands for their services and thus, great
pow'er in bargaining (Wellington & Winter). One reason for the modest estimated
effect of public sector unions appears to be the extensive "spillover" of ""ages-34-
across cities asci result of the extensive r.eliance of local governmerits on
cooparabflitycolTIparisons in wage setting (Ehr~nb~rg & Gol,<is t~in) • A nonunion
city near a unidncityin the same state is likely to pay wages similar to those
in the union city. One study has fOUtld that while police in union and nonunion
cities in the same state teceiveroughly similar pay, police in highly unionized
states obtain a considerable advantage over those in less organized states,
suggesting that public sector unionism hasilldeed had sizeable e.conomic con~
sequences that escape detection from city comparisons (Lauer). Other studie.s
have found that public sector unions have larger effects on fringe benefits .than
on direct pay {Gustman & Segal,Ichniowski, Edwards &Edwards}.
Change (5): Governmental Regulations
One of the major changes in the labor market·in·post-l\Torld War II years
has been an increased role of governmental regulations in determining market
behavior and outcomes. In the area of collective bargaining~ legislative
enactment and NLRB and court decisions have brought internal union affairs
and the bargaining process under greater regulation than ever conceived by the
proponents of the l.;Tagner Act. In the area of personnel policy, the antibias
and affirmative action ruies of the f~deral government have revolutionized
employee selection, promotion, and remuneration policies. In the area of
work place conditions, occupational health and safety acts and enVironmental,
policies have brought governmentalr~l~sand regulations into thewor~ places
of thousands of enterprises. Compensation has also been affected, both·by
equal pay legislatiori and regulation of pension plans. Finally, through its
taxation and social welfare programs, the government has altered the rewards
from working and th~;'fl~or b~neithVhfch thds'e who d3.nnot workmayfalJ.-35-
Regulation of Collective Bargainins
In the period under study, two major pieces of labor legislation
were enacted by the U.S. Congress. The Taft-Hartley Act attempted to redress
what was viewed by many as an imbalance in the labor law favoring unions.
The main purpose of the Landrum-Griffin Act was to regulate the internal
affairs of trade unions to guarantee democratic procedures and reduce the
possibilities of corruption. The laws, interpreted by the National Labor
Relations Board, the Representative of Labor (expressly responsible for the
Landrum-Griffin Act), and the courts have established the method of determining
union representation, modes of bargaining and conflicts, and internal union
practices.
Representation
As noted in Change (4), court rulings and the Taft-Hartley "free speech
provision" have greatly expanded the extent to which employers can campaign
against unions in NLRB elections, making the electoral process more an adversary
procedure than had previously been the case. In addition, the Taft-Hartley
Act outlawed closed shop clauses, which "made union membership a prerequisite
for a job, and permited states to outlaw the union shop, which required member-
ship after employment. Evidence suggests that these changes have
contributed to the gradual diminution of private sector unionism.(Frccnan ~nd
Medoff, 1976; Ellwood and Fine)•.
Bargaining Topics and P~ocedures
The government has also come to play a role in determining the subjects
of collective. bargaining, prescribing mandatory topics about which parties must
bargain (as opposed to permissive topics, about which they can choose not to
discuss), and outlawing other topics. When the Supreme Court ruled in 1949 that
pensions were a mandatory topic, there was a sharp increase in the proportion of
the wage bill going to pensions in unionized industries. In the 1964 Fibreboard
Gase (which made contracting out a mandatory bargaining topic under certain con--36-
.Htions) the Supreme Court noted the extent to which the original intent of the
Wagner Act (to get parties into a room to negotiate, but not to affect the sub-
stance of the negotiations) had been changed.
"There was a time when one mieht have taken the view that•••the courts
have no power to determine the subJ"ectsabout whl."ch partl."es t b i mus arga n••• , l!!../
too much law has been built upon a contrary assumption."
A second, more comple~ legal obligation on the two parties is '~argaining
in good faith". In several important decisions, the NLRB and the courts have
outlawed certain forms of bargaining -- such as Boulwarism, (the General Electric
strategy of making its first offer the full and final offer' and engaging in
a tough propaganda program to sell the offer to workers) -- and have sought to
interpret the state of mind called "good faith". As there are no obligations to




The Taft-Hartley Act outla~ed certain forms of conflict, making it an
unfair labor practice for unions, as well as managments, to coerce employees,
for instance by masspicketing,to engage in secondary boycotts, and to strike
for jurisdictional purposes. The Landrum-Griffin Act added "hot cargo" clauses
(in which management agrees to refuse to deal with other enterprises having
labor disputes) to the list of illegal weapons of conflict.
Internal Union Practices
Far-reaching federal controls on the governance of unions were established
by the Landrum-Griffin Act, passed following the sensational HcClellan Committee
hearings on criminal elements in trade unions: the electoral procedures in unions
"Here brought under the law; a "bill of rights" was enacted to guarantee normal
1emocratic freedoms to members; trusteeships over locals were restricted; and union
leaders ordered to report cert~in Hnanc:l.aitrailsac:tiohs.
To some extent the extensive anddet:ailedregulatioh of collective-37-
bargaining and internal union.democracy may be a necessary concomitant of the use of
government-regulated elections to establish unions. Once the governnent has set
up a procedure for organizing, next it can reasonably be expected to concern
itself with the process and outcome.
Antibias Regulation of Personnel Policies
No institutional change has transfor~ed the labor market more than
the outlawing of discriminatory employment practices by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the requirement that federal contractors engage in
Affirmative Action under Executive Order 11246. "The world of the personnel manager
was changed drastically as the EEO and the courts have enforced and implemented
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act" (Miner and Miner, p.4). Hany traditional modes of
recruiting, testing, and selecting workers.were ended by the EEO laws, replaced
by Affirmative Action searches and "fast tracks" to promote women and minorities.
As Table 4 indicates, a whole set of new personnel practices were initiated as a
result of the Equal Employment Opportunity pressures ·o~ the government. As the
Bureau of National Affairs puts it:
Equal Employment Opportunity (£EO) Programs complete with
Affirmative Action Plans (AAP) are viewed as 'a fact of
life' by nearly all employers, and the personnel function
has changed in a variety of ways as a' result of the
government's efforts to enforce the employment provisions
of the act (p. 1).
The nuscle behind the EEO effort has been the court decisions, whic;l first
tended to weigh heavily the interests of protected groups as opposed to other workers.
Through the early 1970s most court decisions tended to favor active Equal Employ-
ment and Affirmative Action programs. In the mid and late 1970s, however, the
tone of court decisions changed. Instead of Griggs Power, which came down heavily
against employment tests with disparate effects, there was Washington vs. Davis,
which supported tests for the District of Columbia police force. Instead of finding
discriIaination on the basis of statistical disparities., additional inforL1ation on
specific cases of discrimination was also required in several cases. ·In the Weber-38-
Table 4
New Personnel Practices Due to EEO
---% of companies
1. Have Forr-a1 EEO Program
Including Affirmative Action Plan
(of those subject to OFCCP regulations)
86
96
2. Hav~had investigation or other action
under Title VII 63
3. Changes in selection procedures for
EEOC reasons: 60
testing procedures 39
revised job qualifications 31
application forms 20
recruiting techniques 19
4. Special recruiting prog~ams:
for all minority workers 69
for minorities in professional/managerial
positions 58
5. Programs to insure EEO policies are
implemented
communications on EEO policy 95
follow-up personnel or EEO office 85
training sessions on EEO 67
periodic publications of EEO results 48
EEO achievements included in performance
appraisals 33
6. Special training programs
for entry-level jobs 16
for upgrading 24
for management positions 16
Source: Bureau of National Affairs Presonne1 Policies Forum, Equal Employment
Opportunity: Programs and Results, PPF Survey No. 112, March 1976
(line 1-2, Table 9, p. 15; line 3, 'table 3, p. 4; line 4, Table 1,
p. 9; line 5, Table 6, p. ~;, line~, Table 5, p. 8).-39-
Case the entire notion of voluntary affirmative action that involved inverse dis-
crimination came under attack. The decision of the court in favor of Kaiser Steel
and the Steelworkers may have drawn the bounds, however, on the changed direction
of court decisions.
There is a wide variety. of evidence indicating that governmental
equal employment efforts have substantially improved the economic position
of black workers. As Table 5 indicates, there was a marked acceleration in
biack economic progress post-1964, when the federal antibias effort began
(Title VII of the Civil Rights Act outlawing discrimination took eff~ct on
July 1, 1965). As might be expected given pressures of affirmative action pro- ..
grams to place and pronate minorities into higher level jobs that were previously
closed to thee, many of the gains were concentrated among the better educated and
skilled. For the first time in American history, blacks began to obtain manager-
ial and professional jobs in major corporations•. The most rapid gains were made,
it is important to recognize, by young blacks and by black women, both of whom
attained rough economic parity with whites in many markets. Finally, most studies
of the employment of blacks have found greater increases in employment in companies
influenced by federal antibias and affirmative action pressures than in companies
that are less influenced by such pressure (Burman, Ashenfelter &Heckman, Heckman
and Wolpin; see Goldman and Smith for an exception).
w~ile most would agree that at least some of the post-l964 black
economic progress is due to the effect of antibias laws on company employment
practices, some have cited other factors as being important a~ well. Welch
stresses improvements in the quality of education obtained by blacks, while
Butler and Heckman suggest that reduced work force participation of black
28{
relative to white workers may also ,have contributed to the observed changes.--
Though apparently less affected, the position. of women appears to
have also improved, in some respects, by the federal laws. Some women were moved
into traditionally male occupations and others benefited from special promotion-40:-
Table 5
Ratios of Nonwhite to ~fuite
Economic Position and Annual Changes in Ratios
1949-1964 and 1964-1976
V.ar Annual C~O"ll.
19~9/50 1964 1976 8.10'. 1964 All.. 1964
Mal••
M.dian wag.' Gnd aolo,i_.:
All work.,,, .50 .59 .73 0.6 1.2
f~Il·lim•• y.o,.ro~nd
worke,., .64" .65 .77 0.1 1.0
M.dion incom.: P,ol..,iono" .57 .69 .84 1.1 2.1
Reloti•• n~mb., of,
. P,ol...io"ol. .39 .~5 .65 0.4 1.8
Monoll'" .22 .22 .41 0.0. 1.7
Femol••
M.dion ....og.. ond ,olo,i•• .40 .58 .97 1.8 3..5
All wo,k.,,:
f~lI·tim•• y.o,·,o~nd
work.,.; .57" .69 .99 1.3 2.3
Reloti.. n~mb.r of:
Prof.u;cnols .47 .60 .83 0.9 2.1
CI.,icol, .15 .33 .69 1.3 3.3
01955.
50",1(', Incom•• frorn U.S. Bur.au of C.nluI, Curtin' Popula,ion R.ports, Consum., Income
So,i., P~O. Employm.n' f,om Con.~' of Pop~lo'ion. 1950 and U.S. Copor'mon' 01 Lobo"
Hondboo. allobar S/a/ill;", 1977. .-41-
policies designed to alleviate:under-representation in high level jobs.
S;omputerization
In addition to EEO pressures, the personnel practices of major corpora-
tions were also greatly affected by new computer techniques in the period. For
the first tiQe companies have computerized personnel files available (some put
together as a result of court cases regarding discrimination) which permit more
detailed and rigorous tracking and analysis of internal labor markets. The new
technology has begun and will continue to transform personnel policy into
a more integral part of corporate policy making.
Other Market Regulations
The federal government enacted several other ~ajor pieces of legislation
regulating the labor market in the period under study. Among the most important
were:
(a) The Coal Hine Health and Safety Act (1969), which established
dust and ventilation standards in mines and compensation for victims of black lung
disease. In the year~ following the Act, fatality rates fell in bituminous coal,
apparently, at least partially, as a result of the regulations (Connerton).
(b) The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 (OSHA), which requires
that places of employment be free from "recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees" and mandates the
Department of Labor to promulgate and enforce occupational health and safety
standards. Despite the significant powers given to OSHA and efforts of the agency
to monitor work places, it is generally agreed that OSHA failed to live up to
its potential for reducing job injury and disease. There is increasing realiza-
tion of the cOQplexities involved with health and safety prob1eQs, which will
not yield to simplistic strategies based on simple approaches (see Ashford,
SQith, Viscusi).
(c) The Employee Retirement. Income Security Act, which ffiandated that
all retirement plans be vested after ten years, established financial stan--42-
dards for pensions, and ~hich provided federal insurance for pension plans. As
is often the case with governmental regulations, in addition to its planned
effects on pension plans, ERISA appears to have unanticipated effects causing a
26/
number of plans by small companies to be closed down.--
(d) Extension of Minimum Wage coverage. While the level of the
minimum wage has not changed relative to average wages, the fraction. of the
work force covered has increased greatly, which can be expected to increase
its effect. In 1947 56% of workers were covered by the minimum wage; by 1963
the fraction covered had risen to 79%.
(e) Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which outlaws discrimination
against workers between the ages of 40 and 70, and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which outlaws discrimination against handicapped workers.
Sepnding and Taxation
In addition to direct regulations, the government has influenced the
operation of the labor market through its social insurance and welfare manpower
training and taxation policies. In the post-World War II period, many new pro-
grams were initiated and expenditures on existing programs increased while. tax
rates rose significantly.
In 1960 the United States federal expenditure on manpower programs was
approximately $250 million; in 1975 expenditures were over $5 billion a year, more
than a 20-fo1d increase. The legislative cornerstone of this expansion is the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA), and its subsequent
amendments, which is designed to provide training,emplo)~ent,and related ser-
vices for economically disadvantaged, unemployed, and under-employed persons. The
. .
major titles of CETA authorize: a nationwide program of eI:lployment and training
services, including training, employment, counseling, testing, and placement ad-
ministered for the most part by state and local govern::lents; transitional public
service employment and other manpower services in areas with high rates of un--43-
employment; nationally sponsor,ed training and job placement progr~II:s for such
special groups as youth, criminal offenders~ persons of limited English-speaking
abili'ty, seasonal farmworkers, and others with particular market disadvantages;
the Job Corps program of intensive education, training, and counseling for dis-
advantaged youth; and temporary emergency public service jobs to reduce the
impact"of hiBh uQemp10yment. For persons on we1fare,the Work Incentive (WIN)
Program is designed to provide comparable aid in obtaining skills and finding
jobs. In 1976 there were about 2.5 million persons in CETA programs and over
two million registered for WIN. While the results of studies of manpower training
pr03rODS nrc not uniforoly poriitivc, it appcors that trainccs ~oy havc bcncfitcu
froD thcir c::?cricncc, thouGh the return to the invcstncnt ~oy not be thnt high
(Ashenfelter)•
Other programs gave direct financial aid to persons unable to work or
temporarily out of work. Public, social welfare expenditures broadly defined,
the most important of which is Aid to Dependent Children, which provides money
largely for families lacking a male head of household, increased drastically in
the 1960s and 1970s, from 10% of GNP in 1960 to 19% in 1975. Other major
'.,
programs include Social Security disability insurance, and workmen's compensa-
tion, which assist persons injured at work. Another set of programs seeks
to provide funds for particular types of purchases. In 1976, $5.6 billion
were given in Food Stamps to help low income families with food coupons. These
stamps can be used only for purchases of food. Hedicare similarly provides
funds for the medical expenses of older persons. Yet another, Unemployment
29/
Insurance, provides money for persons who have lost their job.--
The effects of these various programs are two-fold. On the one hand,
they clearly raise the economic well-being of persOns suffering economic distress.
One estimate of the net effect of the welfare programs suggests that upwards of
30/
16 million persons have been raised above the official poverty level. On the
other hand, the programs 'also reduce the incentive to work and thus reduce labor
force participation.-44'-
On the taxation side, the gap between before and after tax earnings has
grown steadily in the post-World War II period, as a result of increases in
income, social security and other taxes. In 1949 taxes took up 23% of net
national product; in 1975 taxes amounted to 33% of net national product (IDIP). In
1949 the individual federal income taxes were 7.6% of NNP, while social insurance
taxes accounted for 2.3%. By 1979 the income tax share was 11. 5% and the social
security share 7.2%. While there does not exist a set of widely accepted estimates
of the effect of taxes on the quantity, quality and effort devoted to work, many
believe that the increased gap between what employers pay and what workers re-
31/
ceive in earnings has significantly affected the market.--
Change (6): Structure and Composition of Wages
Once thought of as relatively inflexible, the structure of wages in the
United States, by which I mean the differentials pi:lid workers categorized in
various ways, underwent significant change in the post-~~orld War II period. Edu-
cated workers, young workers, and many highly skilled workers had slower increases
in wages than less educated, older or less skilled w~rkers in the 1970s after
more rapid increases in the 1950s and 19605. Black workers, as noted, had greater
increases in earnings than white workers. While differentials may not have
changed as rapidly as might be desired for optimal allocation of workers or elimi-
nation of discriminatory differences, there is no gainsaying the flexibility of
relative wages in responding to the changes in the supply-demand balance.
Table 6 summarizes evidence on some of the principal changes in the wage
structure in post-World War II years.
Education
One of the most widely heralded changes in the structure of wages has
been the decline in the advantage received by college graduate cen. As the
table shows, from the 1950s through the 1960s, college men earned a sizeable
differential over men with just high school training. In the 1970s, however, the
differential eroded rapidly -- part and parcel of the declining occupational-45-
Table 6

































Source: R. Freeman; "Effect of Demographic Factors on Age-Earnings Profile"
Journal of Human Resources, Summer 1978, Table 2.
"The Facts About the Declining Economic Value of College"
Journal of Human Resources, Winter 1979, Table 1.
u.S~. Department of Labor, Employment an.! Traini~~ Report of the
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position of graduates depicted in Table 3 earlier. The drop in the advantage
to college workers was most pronounced among the young, with starting bachelor's
graduates in several cases earning much less in real terms in the mid-1970s than
comparable workers earned at the end of the 1960s. For instance, the real pay
for beginning B.S. science majors dropped by 21% from 1969 to 1975 and that of
32/
social science or humanities majors by 23%. Since the direct costs of college
rose in the period, the rate of return to college fell carkedly which in turn
lowered enrollment rates among young persons.
The principal cause of the decline in the relative earnings of
young college graduates appears to be the enormous increase in the number of
graduates in the 1970s -- the result of the high fraction of (baby boom) young
persons enrolling for higher ~ducation rather than decreased demand for
college relative to high school graduates. Viewed.strictly from a human capital
investment interpretation, however, an alternative explanation of the change
can be developed: namely that the wages of young graduates have fallen because
graduates are caking greater investcents in on-the-job training as a means of
coping with the increased supply. This view suggests that the
earnings of the workers who graduated in the 1970s will rise rapidly in the
1980s (Welch &Smith). While the long-term significance of the depressed college
. 33/
market of the 1970s thus will rtot be clear for some time,-- thecha.nges of the
period show dramatically the impact of supply and demand on relative earnings
and investments in skills.
Another important change in the structure of wages has been a marked
twist in age-earnings profiles. As Table 6 shows, in 1968 25-34 year old men
earned 15% less than 45-54 year old men. By 1975 the differential had risen to
21%. Among college men, the ratio of 25-34 year. aIds earnin5s to those of
45-54 year olds fell from .72 in 1968 to .61 in 1975. The remarkable increase in
the income advantage of older over young male workers in the period appears to
be primarily due to the changed age composition of the work force noted earlier,
apparently because younger and older male workers are imperfect substitutes in-47-
production. It previously eased the inflow of the large numbers 'of young
workers of the period into employQent and enabled the market to adjust to the
baby boom cohort without oassive increases in youth unemployment. It may also
have created, however, a lifetillle· "cCiI.ort earnings gap" for the entrants of the
1970s. Whether the sizeable drop in the earnings ·of the young in the 1970s will
persist, however, remains to be seen (Welch and Smith).
Specific Skills Groups
Workers in certain occupational and industrial groups also experienced
marked changes in earnings relative to other workers in the postwar period. In
the 1960s,construction average hourly earnings zoomed, rising from 1.26 times
those in manufacturing in 1947 to 1.56 times those in manufacturing in 1969,
only to fall to 1.37 times those in manufacturing by 1979. Scientists, engineers,
college faculty and doctorate personnel enjoyed substantial increases in income
in the sixties and sluggish increases in the seventies.. Workers in the oil
industry had sizeable gains in the 1970s, as did those in coal.
Overall, the pattern of the 1970s was toward lower differentials between
more and less skilled workers, in contrast to stable or rising differentials in
the 1950s and 1960s. As in other changes in the wage structure, the prime reason
appears to be shifts in the demand for those workers compared to the supply.
Finally, as noted earlier, one of the oajor changes in the wage structure
occurred along the racial dimension. Black-white differences diminished signifi-
cantly, apparently as a result of increased demand for labor spurred by govern-
mental EEO efforts.
Significance
The finding that relative wages have changed in the postwar
period in response to labor market conditions sugbests that the price system has
at the least operated in the right direction in rewarding and allocating workers among
sectors. According to the post-war experience, largeillcrcdses in numbers of
workers in particular groups, relative to demand, produced sizeable drops in-48-
wages relative to those of other workers, while large decLeases had the
opposite effect.
Composition of the Wage Bill
Table 7 docu~ents another important chan&e in the pattern of wage payments
in the U.S.: the increased importance of fringe or supplementary benefits. By
1977 over one-third of compensation in major companies consisted of fringes, with
pension plans, vacation and holiday pay, and health insurance constituting
the bulk of privately agreed-upon fringes and social security, the most important
component of legally-required payments.
There are several reasons for the growth of fringe benefits: the tax
advantages which accrue to most fringes, increased worker desires for certain bene-
fits.as incomes rise, union pressures for fringes following rulings that fringes
are valid bargaining topics (fringe benefits are n larger share of wage bills in
union than in nonunion companies) and changes in social security and other l;:at.fQ.
While there are serious problems in international comparisons of wage
bills, particularly with regard to the institutional structure of work forces.
(distinction between regular and temporary workers, for example) available
data suggest that the tendency for a larger share of compensation to take the
form of fringes is not unique to the United States, and that the ratio of
supplementary payments to earnings in the U.S. is by no means high on an inter-
national scale.
























Source: United Staten Bureau of Labor Statioticn, [otin3ted Ecurlv
C0S"l'p_cnsation of Productio..!!.-ll5'rker_s in ;~nuJ?£~~.!"j.!l;..,-O-ct-;ber197G.-49':'
Changes in the Composition of the t-lage Bill In Large Companies: Fringe Benefits as a
Percentage of Payroll Expenses
1951 1977
2. Pension,insurance,& other agreed-upon payments' 5.4
a. pension plan premium~, etc. 3.6
b. life insurance premiUms, etc. 1.4
c. i: separation or teumination pay allowances
allowances *
i1. salary continuation'or long-term
disability **
d. dental insurance premiums **
e. discounts on goods and services 0.2·
f. employee meals ***
g. miscellaneous 0.2
Total




d. Railroad Retirement Tax, etc.
3. Paid rest periods, etc.




d. payments for National Guard duty, jury,
death in family, other personal, etc.
5. Other items
a. profit sharing
b. employee thrift plans
c. bonuses .
d. employee education expenditures
e. special wage payments ordered by courts,














































































Source: u.s. Chamber of Commerce, Employee Benefits 1951 and 1977.-50-
The increased role of supplementary or fringe benefits has substantially
changed the nature of renumeration for work and complicated the meaning to be
attached to "wages". Hhether workers behave differently when a sizeable proportion
of their pay does no.t appear in the weekly pay check than when it does has not
been seriously investigated, however.
Change (7): Unemployl:lent and tolage Inflation
From the point of view of national policy two basic labor market problems
plague national economics: unemployment and hourly wage inflation. In the post-
World tolar II period under study, the level of unemployment' drifted up·...ards. the
composition pf unemployment changed, and there was a significant change in the
level of wage inflation and its link to unemployment and aggregate economic activity.
Level of Composition and Unemploymen~
The level of unemployment in the United States appears to have increased
in the 1970s relative to the 1950s and 1960s. From 1950 to 1959 unemployment
averaged 4.5% per year, with a range from 2.9% to 6.8%. From 1960 to 1969, the
average was slightly higher at 4.8%, with a range from 3.5% to 6.7%. From 1970 to
34/
1977, however, unemployment averaged 6.3%, with a range from 4.8% to 8.5%.-
Analysis of the unemployment rates of separate groups of workers shows that
while changes in the demographic composition of the work force have contributed
to the higher rate, the up\-lard drift in the'1970s is not primarily the result of
changing mix of workers but is, instead, a phenomenon found among virtually all
groups of workers, though it is ~ore pronounced among some than among others.
~~ile part of the upward drift in unemploy~ent rates may be attributable to
changes in unemployment insurance, which leads some workers to remain on unemploy-
ment compensation for large periods of time due to the receipt of funds \V'hile
out of work, nost analysts would attribute the hiGher rates of unenployment to
the state of the aggregate economy -- in particular, the level of demand for
labor (itself af[ected by changes i~ oil and other natural resource prices) and to-51-
governmental macroeconomic policy. Most other ~~jor countries have also experien~ed
an increase in unemployment rates in the 1970s, pointing to world market conditions
as an underlyinK cause of the problem.
The incidence of unemployment in the U.S. has also changed significantly,
with young workers in general and black teenagers in particular having higher
rates of unemployment relative to other workers than in the past, exacerbating
the concentration of and inequality in unemplcynent. On the other end of the
spectrum, white-collar workers and more highly educated workers have also had higher
rates of unemployment relative to others than in the past.
The changing patterns of unemployment rates over time is examined in
figure 4 in terms of the rates of unemployment for selected groups of workers and
the rates predicted by regression of those rates on those of other workers. When
the deviation between actual and predicted rates rises over time, the rate of the
specified group worsens relative to the other group, and conversely, if the
deviations decline over time.
The figure shows:
a moderate increase in the unemployment rate of 16 to 19 year old
white young persons at given levels of total unemployment in the ..,
1960s but not in the 1970s.
a more surprising and less noticed increase in the unemployment of
25 to 34 year old white men relative to older workers, possibly
attributable to demographic forces;
a marked increase in the unemployment rate of black teenagers relative
to the total unemployment rate. The causes of the extraordinary
deterioration in the employment position of these youth has yet
to be satisfactorily explained. \{hatever the causes, however, few
would disagree with the propositio~ that the deteriorated employment
of non-white youth constitutes one of the major ,socia-economic
problems of the period. -----------. - - -.-52-
Figure 4 Actual Unemployment for 16-19 Year Old Uhites
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an increase in the unemployment rate of'white-colla:r workers,
relative to blue-collar workers.
an increase in the unemployment rate of professional and college
trained workers relative to the less·skilled and ~ducated workers,
yet another indicator of the turnaround in the college job market
discussed earlier.
As a result of the changed pattern of unemployment rates and changes in
the composition of the work force, the unemployed worker of the late 1970s had
very different characteristics than the unemployed worker in earlier years. The
unemployed worker of the late 1970s was more likely to be young, black,and also
highly educated and skilled than in the past.
The changing composition of unemployment suggests the need for different
policies to aid the jobless than in th~ past. Young unemployed workers, particu-
larly minority youth in inner cities, have a greater ne~d for job training and
related skill acquisition than the unemployed experienced heads of households
of previous periods. Unemployed profess~onal, managerial, and other white-collar
or college educated workers also represent a new problem, for which existing
policies may be inadequate.
Wage Inflation
Concordant with the upward drift in unemployment over the period has been
an increase in the average rate of wage inflation, creating a substantial policy
problem. From 1950 to 1959, hourly compensation of all persons in private busi-
nesses increased by 5.1% per annum; from 1960 to 1969, hourly compensation of
all persons in private business increased by 4.9% per annum; from 1970 to 1977,
the rate of increase was 7.1%. As figure 5 shows, the increase in wage inflation
in the 1970s despite increased unemployment appears to have significantly
rained the Phillipo curve relation \lhich once ::;uided thinking on the unet:.:l?loYtlcnt-
inflation probletl. \fuercaG in the 1950G and the 19605 a level of unenp10yncnt-56-
Figure 5:
The Relation of Unemployment to Changes in Money Wages
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Report of the
President, 1978, Table G-2, A-l9.-57-
of 6.0Z to 7.0% was associated with 'vage inflation of 4.0% to 5.Qh, in the 19705
it was associated with wage increases nearly twice as high. h~ile it is not
universally agreed that the experience of the 1970s prov~s that there is no 10ng-
term stable tradeoff between unemployment and hourly wage inflation, there is no
doubt that whatever relation exists is quite unstable and an inadequate guide to
policy.
More detailed analyses of the cyclic4l behavior of wages have shown a
further change in the responsiveness of wage to unemployment and aggregate
cyclical conditions in the period under study: a sizeable decline in the reduction
in the rate of wage inflation associated with a given shortfall in aggregate
activity. According to one set of estimates, the effect of unemployment on the
rate of change in wages has become significantly lower in the postwar period than
in the earlier part of the 20th century (Sachs). One important reason for the
declining cyclical sensitivity of wages is the spread of long-term collective bar-
gaining contracts. At the outset of the postwar period most contracts covered a one
year period. By the 19705, most major industrial L~reements were written for a
three year period. Wages set over a three year period are likely·to be unrespon-
sive to unemployment or other measures of market conditions except in the year
the contract is signed. Other factors, such as effective macroeconomic policy,
have also been cited as potential causes of the decreased cyclical responsive-
ness of wages (Sachs).
The upward shift and reduced slope of the unemployment-wage change
schedule make aggregate economic policy oore difficult, which directs attention
;'~"
to a more disaggregated and sectoral approach to both unemployment and wage
inflation problems.-,58-
Conclusion
"Each generation believes itself on the verge of a new economic era, an
era of fundamental change" (NBER, Receht Economic Changes in the United States,
1929, p. ix).
In three decades examined in this study, seven major changes have
taken place in the American labor market, signif~cantly altering the wages,
employment, and institutions at the work plac~. First, the rate of growth of
real wages and productivity declined sharply. While sOme of the decline is
attributable to sectoral shifts in employment, the changing age-sex composition
of the work force, changes in capital-labor ratio's, in~reased regulation, changes
in energy prices, and reduced R&D effect, for'th~ most part the retardation
in growth is a story of changes in the famous "residual", about which, by defini-
tion, we know little.
Second, there have been sizeable demographic changes in the composition
of employment: more women workers, more younKworkers, m01?e educated workers,
and fewer older male workers. In part these changes can be explained by changes
in labor market incentives, but at. least" some remain a puzzle.
Third, the composition of employment has changed sUb~tantially, with
the, number of'workers.in white-collar and skilled jobs, in the South and
,', Southwest, and in local and state government employment rising while the number
in blue-collar and lower skilled jobs has declined. One noticeable pattern
',. h~s been that employment in skilled areas has fallen short of the growth of
the supply of educated labor, with a resultant drop in the quality of jobs
held by' the educated. Another ;15 for employment changes to vary more across
sector,s than wage changes.
Fou~th, the trade union share of the work force has diminishe.d 5Mb-
stantially, with a sharp drop in the proportion unionized in the private sector
overpowering a rise in the proportion organized in the public secfor. Changes
in the age-sex-:"skill mix of the work force explain perhaps 60% of the decline-59-
in private sectororgan!zation, but increased managerial opposition and
. "
effectiveness in contesting NLRB elections is also important in accounting for
the diminished number of private sector unionism. Growth of public sector
organization appears to be closely linked to changes in public sector labor
relations laws.
Fifth, governmental regulation of the labor market and of the internal
operation of management and labor has been greatly expanded. Equal employment
legislation and affirmative action requirements have "changed the personnel
function. A wide variety of acts, like Occupation Health and Safety or the
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, have changed the "rules" of labor
market behavior, in some cases with sizeable effects on basic economic factors.
Sixth, the structure of earnings has be~n si~nificantlyaltered by
shifts in the demand/supply balance. In the period studied, college graduates,
particularly the young and those in the educational sector, young male workers,
and those in several highly skilled occupations have suffered declines in
relative earnings. Black workers have significantly gained compared to white
workers. Fringe benefits increased in importance in the wage package.
Seventh, the composition of unemployment and its relation to wage
inflation has also undergone tl)ajor change. Young black workers and highly
educated men have come to bear a greater share of unemployment. The rate of
inflation consistent with particular levels of unemployment has increased
rapidly.
COtl)parisons With 1929 NBER Conference
The changes delineated in this paper can be fruitfully compared to
those exatl)in~d half a century earlier at the 1929 NBER Conference on Recent
Economic Changes, in which Leo Wolman wrote a section on labor.
Which of the seven changes are similar to those cited in the earlier
volume? To what extent do our changes represent continuation of long-term
developments and to what extent do they significantly diverge from historical-60-
changes?
An~wers to these questions should provide perspective on the nature of
changes in the post-World War II period.
Four of our changes, while different in some cases in direction, have
definite parallels with those in the earlier period.
In 1929, as in 1979, the changing demographic structure of the work force,
due to declining birth rates and immigration wa~ of SOI:le concern. In 1929, however,
the increased participation of women was not given serious attention.
Similarly, in 1929, as in 1979, patterns of change in the composition of
employment -- increases in white-collar and skilled jobs, declines in farming -_
received attention. While the 1970s may be relatively unique in that growth of
employment in skilled areas has fallen short of the growth of educated labor
there is nothing surprising ~n the existence of significant shifts in employment
among sectors.
Sizeable changes in the wage structure were also observed in the 1929
volume. Though the direction and nature of changes differed fundamentally
between the periods, changes in relative wages appear to be a .hallmark of the
United States' labor market.
Decline in unionization in the 1920s parallels to some extent the
decline in the post-World 1.Jar II period, though here more fundamental differences
also arise. In the 1920s, the total number of union members, as well as the union
share of the work force fell, whereas in the post-World \-lar II period, union
membership rose, while the proportion of workers covered fell. }loreover, there
was nothing in the 1920s comparable to the spurt in public sector organization
in the later period. Still, in the period covered by this essay and in the
earlier period, declines in unionization were a major development.
Three of oui seven changes, by contrast, seem to differ greatly from those
stressed in the 1929 volume.
First is the increased governmental regulation of the labor market and-61-
of the internnl opcrntiono of r~nn~encnt ~nd 1nbor. Governncntnl ir.tcrvcntion
in the market following World War I seems to have been sufficiently modest as to
draw virtually no attention from analysts. Peace time growth of governmental
regulation in the recent decades appears to be a relatively unique development.
Second is the 1970s concern over the growth of real wages and productivity,
which has no parallel in the earlier period of time. In the 1929 conference,
continued rapid advance of the economy was assured by all: liThe spread of
higher living standards [is] not new, but in its degree and scope it has taken
on new importance" (NBER, P. xi). The loss of confidence in growth, due to the slug&isl
performance in the 1970s, is a strikingly new development.
Third is the drift upwards in both unempioyment and rates of wage
inflation, which ~')nstitutes the aggregate economic problem of the 1970s. By
contrast, in 1929, there was little concern with overall levels of unemployment
(which were viewed as satisfactory) or with inflation, due to an "increasing
tendency" toward price staibility.
Finally, it is important to remember that all of the labor market
changes stressed in the 1929 conference were, of course, completely over-·
shadowed by the change about to occur -- the Great Depression, the development
of which no analyst managed to foresee. Hopefully, the changes examined in
this paper will not be overshadowed by forces escaping current attention that




See J. Hark "Productivity Trends and Prospects" in C. Kerr &J. TI.osow
Work in America: The Decad~ Ahead (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1979).
This can be seen by ~xamining the earnings by industry data in U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics Handbook of Labor Statistics 1978, Table n.
p. 313. In coal the rate of increase in real earnings rose from 1.6%
~
(1950-1969) to 1.8% (1969-1977), using the C~P.I. Deflater.
Regression of the log of output per manhour (0) on unemployment (U),
trend (T) and trend post-1970 (T70) yielded:
o = 3.97 + .033T - .010U - .d12T70
(.001) (.003) (.002)
R2 = .995
Regression of the log of. real compensation per manhour (C) on the same
variables yielded:





An alternative way of showing the' changed trend in productivity growth
and real wages is to assume that the y follow a random with a
drift and regressed changes (~) in the variables. (Suggested by Orley
Ashenfelter). The results of this calculation are given below:
60 = -.005 -.005T70 + .008U - .0076U
(.001) (.003) (.003)






The Bureau of Labor Statistics data are contained in U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity and Technology,
"Estimated Hourly Compensation of Workers in Manufacturing; Ten Countries,
1960, 1965-1978", (October 1978).
If one correlates the rate of growth of real wage for 1967 to 1977 ,.lith
the level of real wages in 1967 in that document, one does find a negative-63-
Spearman rank correlation of -.55, indicating that there is a pattern for slower
growth in higher wage countries. However, less than 25% of the country varia-
tion in real wage growth can be explained by bariation in initial levels.
Thus the United States lags more in real wage ·growth than in productivity
growth.
!!..I
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1978,
all figures except for illegal alien which is a rough estimate from
M. Piore.
Jj
u.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Uandbook of Labor Statistics 1978,
p. 34.
~I
Estimated by ou1tip1ying the percentage of all households composed
of husband-wife families by the percentage of those families with
husbands in the labor force and wives not. A ~omparab1e figure for
1955 was 46%. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics ,Handbook of Labor
Statistics 1978, Table 27 and u.S. Department of Commerce Statistical
Abstract 1976, Table 50.
2..1
u.s. Bureau of Labor Statistics Handbook of Labor Statistics 1978,
p. 12.
101
See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,Euucationa1 Attainoent of v:o~kers,
Harch 1977.
111
Data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Handbook of Labor Statistics
1978, Table 15.
lJJ
See R. Freeman The Overeducated Anerican (Academic Press, 1976) for
these and related data.
1-}j
See, for exanple, O. Ashenfelter" and J. Heckman, "The Estiraation of
Income and Substitution Effects in a Model of F "1 L b a01 y a or Supply",
Econometrics 42 (January 1974): pp. 73-86.-64-
For a review of the time series literature see J. Hincer, "Labor Force
Participation of Harried Women", in Prosperity and Une~ploYr.1ent.
edited by R. Gordon (New York: Wiley, 1966).
l!!.1
Fields, J. "A comparison of Intercity Differences in the Laobr Force
Participation Rates of Harried Women in 1970 with 1940, 1950, and 1960",
Journ~l 9J ~n Resources, Fall, 1976, p. 576.
151
1975 estimated by dividing current (1975) dollars of consumer durab1es
of $497 billion as reported in the U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical
Abstract 1976, p. 428, Table 695, by 71.1 million households (ibid.,
p. xiii) with 1952 data for trend from U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical
Statistics of the U.S." Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1, p. 252, series
F-373, and Historical Statistics of the U.S., Colonial Times to 1957.
p. 15, series A242. The 1952 value was $2,079 (in 1958 dollars).
1:2../
These data taken from Free~an (1976), p. 168, figure 29.
g/
This is based on an index of job satisfaction rather than a single
measure. See R.P. Quinn & G.L. Staines, The 1977 Quality of Eup10yment
Survey, p. 306, Table 18.5.
181
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1978,
Table 42, p. 134; Table 34.
!:J...I
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics" Employment and Earnings, U.S. 1909-
1975, p. 4 and p. 313, and Employment and Earnings, J('.1u,":r~· 1979, p. 75
for coal mininb, Harch 1970, p. 64 for aircraft and parts.
20/
The data for three digit Census occupations are from R. Freeman,
"An Empirical Analysis of the Fixed Coefficient 'Hanpower Requirements'
~ode1, 1960-1970", Journal of Human Resources (1980b). The other
data calculated from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor
Sta~~~ics 1978, Table 45 and Table 95.-65-
Jd/
Calculated from data iri U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook~f
Labor Statistics 1978, Table 81.
1:1./
Data from 1977: numbers in elections won by unions from National
Labor Relations Board 42nd Annual Report, p~ 294. Numbers of nonagri-
cultural workers from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of
Labor Statistics 1978, Table 42.
Earlier years: R. Freeman and J. l1edoff "The Dwindling of Private
Sector Unionism in the U.S." (in process).
2:1/
This estimate is obtained by calculating the unionization rate one would
expect in one year given the fractions organized of various demographic
groups in another year.
24/ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1978,






See Freel:lan and 1'1edoff "The Dwindling of Private Sector Unionism in
the U.S." and National Labor Relations Board, 42nd Annual Report,
Table 2, p. 269.
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Fibreboard Case.
Bok and Dunlop among others, have argued that the duty to bargain has
little impact. For a contrary view see Ross.
For a survey of the literature see R. Freeman "Black Economic Progess
Post-1964, \-1ho Has Gained and 'Why?". The Butler & Heckman survey is
unfortunately marred by use of incorrect data, which leads to an under-
estimate of the effect of post-l964 governmental policy.
Social insruance statistics taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract 19.76,line 459, p. xvii; line 630, p. xix.-66-
30/
-- Calculated from data in M. Paglin "Transfer in Kind: The IMpact on
Poverty, 1959-1975", Hoover Institution Conference on Income Redistri-
bution, October 1977.
Calculated from data in Tax Foundation, Facts and Figures on Governoent
Finances, 1977, Tables 15, 21, and 82.
]1./
See R. Freeman, The Overeducated American for this and other related
evidence on the falling value of college.
ll../
According to some analysts, the college job market will improve for
new graduates in the 1980s when the supply of new decree recipients
falls.
34/
Calculated from data in U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of
Labor Statistics 1978, Table A-I.Bruno,
I' .'
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